










































































broadens	 the	well-established	agent-trustee	distinction	 to	 include	 cooptation	and	orchestration	as	 two	
additional	modes	of	 indirect	 governance.	 Four	 empirical	 cases	 from	 the	 realm	of	 EMU	governance	are	
provided,	 i.e.	 the	European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM),	 the	European	Central	Bank	 (ECB),	 the	proposed	
European	Minister	of	Economics	and	Finance	(EMEF)	and	the	European	Fiscal	Board	(EFB).	The	article	asks	









(Gocaj	 and	Meunier	 2013;	 Ban	 and	 Seabrooke	 2017)	 and	 the	 empowerment	 of	 existing	 ones	 like	 the	
European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	that	took	over	the	responsibility	for	micro-prudential	supervision	of	 large	
banks	 (Howarth	 and	Quaglia	 2013;	 Epstein	 and	Rhodes	 2016;	De	 Rynck	 2016).	 Remarkable	 about	 this	
institutional	 change	 is	 that	 it	 played	out	against	 the	backdrop	of	member	 states’	 impaired	 capacity	 to	
delegate	more	sovereign	competences	to	the	European	level	due	to	increasingly	eurosceptic	mass	publics	







board	 of	 the	 Commission	 -	 could	 enlist	 national	 fiscal	 councils	 to	 govern	 fiscal	 policy	 choices	 of	
governments	indirectly.	In	each	case	it	is	supranational	agency	trying	to	bypass	states	by	enlisting	existing	
authority	(Abbott	et	al.	2015a).	The	new	intergovernmentalists	predict	that	in	the	post-Maastricht	period	
competences	 are	 primarily	 delegated	 to	 de	 novo	 bodies	 like	 the	 ESM	 or	 the	 ECB	 ‘that	 often	 enjoy	
considerable	autonomy	by	way	of	executive	or	legislative	power	and	have	a	degree	of	control	over	their	
own	resources’	(Bickerton,	Hodson,	and	Puetter	2015,	705).	Accordingly,	these	bodies	‘fulfill	functions	that	
could	 have	 been	 delegated	 to	 the	 Commission’	 and	 their	 governance	 structure	 is	 often	 controlled	 by	
member	states	(Bickerton,	Hodson,	and	Puetter	2015,	705).	The	EMEF	and	the	EFB	examples	illustrate	a	





The	 article’s	 empirical	 focus	 lies	 on	 institutions	 operating	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 EMU	 governance,	 i.e.	 the	
European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM),	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB),	the	proposed	European	Minister	
of	 Economics	 and	 Finance	 (EMEF)	 and	 the	 European	 Fiscal	 Board	 (EFB).	 These	 four	 institutions	 are	
categorized	according	to	a	new	typology	proposed	by	Abbott	et	al.	(2018),	which	distinguishes	between	
agents,	trustees,	co-optors	and	orchestrators.	They	differ	in	terms	of	degree	of	independence,	mandate,	













The	 fourth	 section	 illustrates	 how	 supranational	 actors	 attempt	 to	 enlist	 existing	 authority	 to	 bypass	
















facing	 the	 veto	 power	 of	member	 states.	 Second,	 principals	 need	 to	 choose	 between	managing	 their	
indirect	governance	 relationship	 in	a	hierarchical	or	non-hierarchical	manner	 (Abbott	et	al.	2018).	This	
choice	is	subject	to	a	‘competence-control’	trade-off	(Abbott	et	al.	2018,	6).	A	principal	can	grant	an	agent	
significant	autonomy	to	develop	her	competence	which	might	make	it	more	difficult	to	control	the	latter.	
Thus,	when	 it	 is	particularly	 important	 to	minimize	agency	 loss,	 the	principal	will	opt	 for	delegation	or	


















intermediary	 ‘in	pursuit	of	a	 joint	governance	goal’	 (Abbott	et	al.	2015b,	722).	Orchestration	can,	thus,	


















paid-in	 capital	 to	 the	 ESM.	 By	 pooling	 financial	 resources	 member	 states	 can	 achieve	 substantial	
economies	of	scale	and	scope	that	would	not	be	attainable	in	the	absence	of	delegation.	Ultimately,	the	
ESM’s	 financial	 fire-power	will	be	 larger	 than	the	sum	of	 its	parts	due	to	 its	superior	credit	 rating	 that	
lowers	the	average	borrowing	costs.	Linking	the	dispersal	of	financial	assistance	to	conditionality	allows	
creditor	countries	to	minimize	the	risk	of	moral	hazard.		
In	 a	 trusteeship,	 ‘a	 trustor	 (principal)	 grants	 authority	 to	a	 trustee	 (agent)’	Abbott	 et	 al.	 (2018,	10).	 In	
contrast	to	a	P-A	relationship,	it	is	not	managed	hierarchically	because	the	trustee	usually	is	bound	by	a	
narrow	 mandate	 and,	 therefore,	 the	 trustor	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 hard	 means	 of	 controlling	 the	 trustee	
(Majone	2001;	Alter	2008).	This	can	cause	an	inversion	of	the	authority	relationship	ex	post	(Abbott	et	al.	
2018,	10).	During	 the	euro	area	crisis,	member	states	came	to	realize	 that	 they	were	 issuing	debt	 in	a	

















authority	 is	 a	 scarce	 resource	 for	 them	 and	 its	 delegation	 is	 legally	 constrained	 (i.e.	 by	 the	 Meroni	
doctrine).	Second,	enlisting	existing	authority	allows	them	to	deepen	integration	without	facing	potential	





and	wealth	 (Abbott	 et	 al.	 2018,	 11).	 After	 the	 co-optor	 ‘got	 a	 foot	 in	 the	 door’	 she	 can	 increase	 her	
authority	 over	 time.	 The	 European	 Commission’s	 proposal	 to	 make	 the	 Eurogroup	 President	 a	 Vice-
President	of	the	Commission	(‘a	double-hatted	EMEF’)	follows	the	cooptation	pattern.	By	supporting	the	
Eurogroup	 President	 (co-optee)	with	 additional	 competences	 (such	 as	 a	 future	 euro	 area	 budget)	 the	
Commission	(co-optor)	tries	to	enlist	its	existing	authority.	Over	time,	however,	the	Eurogroup	President’s	
dependence	on	the	Commission	might	grow	and	the	authority	relationship	could	be	inversed.	Thus	far,	





hard	policy	 instruments	 to	govern	a	 target	directly	 (Abbott	et	 al.	 2015b,	720;	2018,	11).	 It	 can	govern	
effectively	 without	 the	 need	 for	 a	 massive	 transfer	 of	 competences	 and	 financial	 resources.	 It	 relies	
11	
	





















2017).	 Today,	 it	 possesses	 an	 authorized	 capital	 stock	 of	 €704.8bn	 (€80.5bn	 paid-in	 +	 €624.3	 callable	
capital).	The	main	ESM	decision-making	body	–	the	Board	of	Governors	-	consists	of	the	Finance	ministers	
of	the	euro	area	and	is	equivalent	to	the	Eurogroup.	Germany,	France	and	Italy	obtained	a	de	facto	veto	





line	with	the	share	of	subscribed	ESM	capital	 further	bolstered	the	 influence	of	the	 larger	contributing	
member	states.		
Several	 political	 economy	 considerations	 played	 a	 role	 during	 the	 ESM’s	 creation.	 First,	 a	 permanent	
bailout	mechanism	would	 put	 a	 higher	 financial	 burden	 on	 European	 taxpayers	 due	 to	 the	 increased	
financial	commitments.	While	the	EFSF	had	only	been	backed	up	by	guarantees	of	the	euro	area	member	




intergovernmental	 ESM	 treaty	 required	 a	 fresh	 round	of	 parliamentary	 ratification,	which	had	 already	
proven	to	be	politically	costly	in	the	case	of	its	predecessor	the	European	Financial	Stability	Facility	(EFSF).	
The	 ability	 to	 tap	 the	 ESM	 was	 made	 conditional	 upon	 the	 prior	 ratification	 of	 the	 Fiscal	 Compact	
(Schimmelfennig	2014).	Fourth,	compared	 to	 the	EFSF,	 the	ESM	would	be	equipped	with	an	expanded	

























Seabrooke	 (2017,	 10)	 observed	 that	 ‘institutionally,	 the	 ESM	 is	 a	 ‘Catch-22’:	 it	 is	 a	 policy	 instrument	
intended	to	provide	‘bail-outs’,	in	the	context	of	the	EU	founding	treaties	that	prevent	bail-outs.’	The	only	













Majone	 (2001)	 has	 convincingly	 argued	 that	 non-majoritarian	 institutions	 such	 as	 independent	 central	











government	 can	 enhance	 its	 credible	 commitment	 to	 pursue	 anti-inflationary	 policies	 (Kydland	 and	
Prescott	1977).	A	central	bank	that	functions	as	the	agent	of	the	government	would	lack	the	credibility	to	
firmly	anchor	long-term	inflation	expectations	due	to	the	time-inconsistency	problem.	The	euro	area	crisis	
has	 bolstered	 Majone’s	 conceptualization	 of	 the	 ECB	 as	 a	 trustee.	 First,	 it	 has	 confirmed	 that	 the	















agent	 if	 it	 strays	 beyond	 its	 mandate	 are	 less	 effective	 because	 a	 trusteeship	 is	 managed	 in	 a	 non-







to	 ‘break	 the	 sovereign-bank	 nexus’	 (Véron	 2015).	 The	 ECB	 was	 adamant	 that	 a	 Single	 Supervisory	
Mechanism	(SSM)	was	essential	for	the	viability	of	EMU.	The	central	bank’s	policy	entrepreneurship	led	to	
the	convergence	of	member	states’	preferences	and	decisively	contributed	to	its	entrustment	(De	Rynck	










(Gren,	 Howarth,	 and	Quaglia	 2015).	 The	 downstream	 consequence	 of	 further	 empowering	 an	 already	
competent	trustee	will	increase	the	likelihood	of	authority	inversion.	Like	in	the	realm	of	monetary	policy,	















roadmap’	 the	Commission	proposed	 to	establish	a	European	Minister	of	Economy	and	Finance	 (EMEF)	
(European	Commission	2017a).	Such	a	‘double-hatted’	EMEF	would	be	a	Vice-President	of	the	Commission	
and	at	the	same	time	the	President	of	the	Eurogroup.	‘The	European	Minister	would	also	oversee	the	use	
of	 EU	 and	 euro	 area	 budgetary	 instruments	 and	 seek	 to	 maximise	 the	 impact	 in	 support	 of	 shared	
priorities’	 (European	 Commission	 2017a,	 10).	 By	 bundling	 and	 repackaging	 existing	 competences,	 the	





















Cooptation	 attempts	 to	 counter	 the	 new	 intergovernmental	 dynamics	 that	 give	member	 states	 a	 firm	
intergovernmental	grip	on	the	ESM’s	and	the	Eurogroup’s	decision-making	procedures.	It,	thus,	features	
prominently	 in	the	supranational	toolkit	because	 it	allows	actors	to	(1)	escape	the	straight-jacket	of	 its	
own	 capability	 deficits	 (Abbott	 et	 al.	 2018),	 (2)	 buffer	 the	 intergovernmental	 encroachment	 of	 their	






interpretation	of	 the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	 (SGP)	 (Reuters	2016).	As	a	 consequence,	 co-opting	 the	
Eurogroup	President	became	increasingly	attractive	for	the	Commission.	Abbott	et	al.	(2018,	11)	point	out	
that	 ‘like	 trusteeship,	 cooptation	 inverts	 authority	 over	 time,	 but	 in	 reverse:	 ex	 ante	 the	 co-optee	 is	
superior,	as	 the	co-optor	must	bid	 for	 its	 favor;	ex	post	 the	co-optor	 is	 superior,	as	 the	co-optee	must	
comply	with	its	directives’.	Thus,	a	EMEF	is	likely	to	gradually	divert	agenda	setting	powers	away	from	the	
member	states	towards	the	European	level.	Many	practical	hurdles	would	have	to	be	cleared	with	regards	
to	 the	 EMEF’s	 legal	 status,	 political	 accountability	 and	 mandate	 (see	 Xanthoulis	 2018).	 Even	 if	 the	







the	same	time,	member	states	are	reluctant	to	cede	control	over	a	 ‘core	state	power’	 like	 fiscal	policy	
(Genschel	and	Jachtenfuchs	2016).	To	foster	local	ownership	with	the	fiscal	rules	the	six-pack,	two-pack	
and	 the	 Fiscal	 Compact	mandated	all	 euro	area	 countries	 to	establish	 ‘functionally	 autonomous’	 fiscal	
councils	at	the	national	level	(Fasone	and	Griglio	2013;	Fromage	2017).	The	rationale	of	member	states	to	








providing	 impartial	 fiscal	 assessments	 of	 the	 ‘true’	 fiscal	 stance	 of	 a	 government	 to	 parliamentarians,	
voters,	the	media	and	other	intermediaries	such	as	credit	rating	agencies,	a	fiscal	council	can	indirectly	
orchestrate	 fiscal	 discipline	 and,	 thereby,	 improve	 the	 compliance	 with	 the	 fiscal	 rules	 (Beetsma	 and	
Debrun	 2017).	 In	 some	 euro	 area	 countries,	 national	 fiscal	 councils	 already	 function	 as	 reputable	
watchdogs	with	a	heightened	public	profile	that	can	increase	the	political	costs	for	governments	pursuing	
fiscally	profligate	policies	(Horvath	2018).	
Enlisting	 existing	 authority	 is	 a	 means	 by	 which	 a	 supranational	 actor	 can	 resist	 intergovernmental	
encroachment	on	its	own	authority	and	make	credible	commitments.	The	diffusion	of	fiscal	councils	across	
the	 EU	 posed	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	 Commission	 because	 it	 threatened	 to	 lead	 to	 inconsistent	 rule	








Annex	3).	 The	EFB	was	 formally	established	on	1	November	2015	and	became	 fully	operational	on	19	
October	 2016	 after	 the	College	of	 Commissioners	 appointed	 its	members	 based	on	 a	 proposal	 by	 the	
Commission	President.	 It	 consists	of	 a	 chair	 and	 four	 additional	members	 to	be	appointed	 for	3	 years	






orchestrate	 fiscal	 discipline	 indirectly.	 The	 EFB’s	 direct	 interference	 with	 member	 states’	 fiscal	 policy	






































Delegation	 § Member	 states	 control	
disbursement	 of	 funds	 and	
decision-making	 (de	 facto	 veto	
right	for	large	MS)	
§ Reduced	 fiscal	 exposure	 and	
national	audience	costs	
§ Preserved	 budgetary	 sovereignty	
of	national	parliaments	
ECB/SSM	 § Severing	 the	 sovereign-bank	
nexus	








Trusteeship	 § Marketization	 of	 traditionally	
strong	bank-state	ties		
§ Reduction	 of	 national	 economic	
policy	discretion	over	time	
§ Credible	 commitment	 to	 financial	
stability		
§ SSM’s	authority	is	likely	to	increase	
over	 time	 as	 more	 banks	 will	 be	
supervised	 directly	 at	 the	
European	level	
§ Few	 effective	 ex	 post	 controls	 to	
sanction	the	trustee	
EMEF	 § Supranational	 control	 of	 the	
Eurogroup	Presidency	
§ Agenda-setting	 role	 for	 the	
Commission	in	the	Eurogroup	
§ Align	 the	 goals	 of	 the	
Eurogroup	more	 closely	with	
the	Commission’s	
Cooptation	 § Gradually	 divert	 agenda	 setting	
powers	 away	 from	 the	 member	
states	towards	the	European	level	
§ Broaden	 the	 reach	 beyond	 the	
boundaries	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
formal	authority	
§ Severing	 intergovernmental	 grip	
on	the	ESM’s	and	the	Eurogroup’s	
decision-making	procedures	




SGP	 (lower	 debt	 levels	 and	







§ Enlist	 national	 fiscal	 councils	 to	
govern	fiscal	policy	indirectly	
§ Increase	 local	 ownership	 of	 and	
compliance	with	the	fiscal	rules	
§ Commission	 can	 bypass	 member	
states	as	veto	players	
§ Strengthening	 of	 horizontal	
consistency	 of	 the	 decisions	 and	
22	
	





§ overcome	 credible	 commitment	
problems	despite	scarce	authority	






The	 traditional	 intergovernmental	 modes	 of	 indirect	 governance	 are	 delegation	 and	 trusteeship.	 This	






reign	 in	 intergovernmental	 fora	 like	the	Eurogroup	by	coopting	 its	President	through	 increased	powers	




hence,	 they	 do	 not	 require	 any	 additional	 financial	 resources.	 Thus,	 they	 lower	 the	 price	 of	 deeper	
integration.	Second,	no	treaty	change	is	required	to	establish	a	co-optor	or	an	orchestrator	because	they	
can	operate	on	a	‘thin’	legal	and	political	basis.	An	ordinary	Commission	Decision	that	does	not	involve	co-















reputation	 and	 (2)	 large	 discretionary	 decision-making	 authority	 based	 on	 the	 trustee’s	 professional	
criteria/judgement	(3)	on	behalf	of	a	beneficiary.	This	has	important	downstream	consequences	for	the	
politics	between	the	principal	and	the	agent/trustee.	The	dynamics	of	P-A	relationships	are	dominated	by	
the	 credible	 threat	 to	 engage	 in	 recontracting	 if	 the	 agent	 behaves	 in	ways	 inimical	 to	 the	 principal’s	
preferences.	If	the	ESM	would	take	risky	decisions	that	would	endanger	its	financial	resources,	member	
states	would	step	in.	In	contrast,	trustees	possess	an	‘independent	source	of	authority’	that	protects	them	
from	political	 interference	 (Alter	2008,	41).	Decisions	by	 the	ECB/SSM	cannot	be	easily	subverted	by	a	




to:	 (1)	 agencies	 coopting	 networks	 –	 what	 Levi-Faur	 (2011)	 has	 termed	 ‘agencified	 networks’	 or	 (2)	
networks	empowering	agencies	resulting	in	‘networked	agencies’.	National	fiscal	councils	have	created	a	
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